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Abstract Inconsistent Wndings regarding the emotional
Stroop eVect in healthy subjects may be explained by con-
founding eVects of stimulus valence and arousal, as well as
individual diVerences in anxiety. We examined reaction
time data in a healthy sample using the emotional Stroop
task while carefully matching arousal level of positive and
negative words. Independent of valence, emotional relative
to neutral words elicited emotional interference, indicating
that arousal determines emotional interference. Indepen-
dent of valence, emotional words were better re-called and
recognized than neutral words. Individual diVerences in
state anxiety were associated with emotional interference,
that is, emotional interference was enhanced in subjects
with high state anxiety. There was no inXuence of trait anx-
iety. These Wndings indicate that word arousal produces
emotional interference independent of valence. State anxiety
exacerbates interference of emotional words by further
biasing attention towards emotionally salient stimuli.
Introduction
Emotional processes have an essential inXuence on cognitive
processes. One approach to investigate interference eVects of
emotional material on cognitive processing is to use the emo-
tional Stroop task (e.g. Williams et al. 1996) in which sub-
jects have to name the ink colour of word stimuli as fast and
accurately as possible, while at the same time ignoring the
word meaning. Slowing of naming the ink colour of emo-
tional as compared to neutral words represents the emotional
interference eVect and indicates biasing of attentional
resources towards the emotionally salient information
(Williams et al. 1997). Such an attentional bias for emotional
stimuli was also shown with pictures (Schimmack 2005) and
other tasks used in attention research, e.g. the dot probe task
(MacLeod et al. 1986) and the spatial cueing task (see
Bar-Haim et al. 2007). So far, however, the emotional Stroop
task is the most frequently used experimental design to
investigate attentional bias (Williams et al. 1996).
To date, it remains unclear whether valence or arousal of
emotional material determines interference (Schimmack
2005). Pratto and John (1991) repeatedly found that colour-
naming latencies were longer for negative as compared to
positive words (categorical negativity theory). Those authors
take interference as an indicator of automatic processing of
negative stimuli as they have greater signiWcance for the indi-
vidual (Pratto and John 1991). This attentional negativity bias
has been supported by a number of studies using the emo-
tional Stroop task (e.g. McKenna and Sharma 1995; Sharma
and McKenna 2001). There is less consistent evidence for an
interference eVect of positive words, though (Dalgleish 1995;
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Ruiz-Caballero and Bernandez 1997). A study by Pratto
(1994) revealed that negative and positive words that were
both high in arousal elicited emotional interference. Similarly,
Schimmack (2005) reported that interference eVects elicited
by emotional pictures depended solely on their arousal level
and not on their valence, and Lang et al. reported that subjects
choose to look longer at arousing pictures independently of
their valence (Lang et al. 1993). Furthermore, in a recent
study using a spatial attention task with emotional pictures,
high levels of stimulus arousal as compared to low levels of
stimulus arousal were associated with an attention shift within
the visual space; an eVect that was found irrespective of stim-
ulus valence (Robinson and Compton 2006). Finally, the
aVective modulation of the attentional blink was related to the
arousal level of word stimuli rather than to their valence
(Anderson 2005).
In conclusion, there is ample evidence to suggest that the
arousal level, and not valence of emotional stimuli matters
in producing emotional interference. Indeed, a direct com-
parison of emotional words with high vs. low arousal
showed that in healthy individuals highly arousing stimuli
elicited greater interference than stimuli with low arousal,
however, the eVect was more pronounced for negative than
for positive words (Compton et al. 2003). Consequently, this
requests a thorough control of arousal levels of emotional
stimuli of diVerent valences, especially because negative
emotional stimuli are frequently more arousing than positive
emotional stimuli (Lang et al. 1993). For instance, the
covariation between arousal and valence appears to be stron-
ger for unpleasant adjectives than for pleasant adjectives and
regression lines relating arousal to unpleasant or pleasant
valence diVer in steepness and slope (Herbert 2007; Ito et al.
1998). Thus, it is more likely for negative words to be asso-
ciated with high arousal than for positive words (Lang et al.
1997). In that sense, a meta-analysis concerning the impact
of positive stimuli in emotional Stroop and dot probe tasks
(Ruiz-Caballero and Bernandez 1997) only found partial
evidence for an attentional bias for positive words. How-
ever, the included studies were quite diverse (non-clinical
anxious subjects, clinical subjects, anxiety induction vs.
low/high trait anxious subjects) and the actual arousal level
of words was not controlled systematically.
To investigate whether the emotional interference in
healthy subjects is mediated by valence or arousal, we used
negative and positive words that were comparable in
arousal level in an emotional Stroop task.
Individual diVerences in aVectivity, such as anxiety in
healthy subjects were also shown to inXuence emotional
interference and may account for inconsistent Wndings con-
cerning the emotional interference eVect (Bar-Haim et al.
2007; EgloV and Hock 2001; Richards et al. 1992). To date,
it remains unclear whether enhanced emotional interference
in healthy anxious subjects is rather a function of stable per-
sonality traits (e.g. trait anxiety) or of transient mood states
(e.g. state anxiety). Trait anxiety reXects a more general and
relatively stable tendency to respond with anxiety, while
state anxiety represents a more transitory and temporary
condition of anxiety that can diVer between situations (Laux
et al. 1981). Whereas the inXuence of trait anxiety has been
investigated (Dalgleish 1995; Richards et al. 1992; see
Williams et al. 1996 for a review), only few studies exam-
ined the inXuence of state anxiety or interactive eVects of
trait and state anxiety on emotional interference and pro-
duced inconsistent results (Broadbent and Broadbent 1988;
EgloV and Hock 2001; see Bar-Haim et al. 2007). This may
be due to methodological diVerences in the investigation of
eVects of state anxiety as natural mood studies typically
yielded stronger eVects than mood induction studies
(Rusting 1998). To address this issue we assessed individual
diVerences in state and trait anxiety in a healthy sample and
their inXuence on emotional interference.
Emotional material also has an impact on memory pro-
cesses: emotional stimuli are better re-called and recog-
nized than neutral stimuli, an eVect that has been labelled
memory enhancement eVect. This has been found equally
for pictures, words, sentences, autobiographical events, and
stories (Hamann 2001; Kensinger and Corkin 2003; Linton
1982; Waagenar 1986; Rubin 2005). There is evidence that
arousal is a driving force behind these memory eVects, as
pictures that are high in arousal are better remembered than
pictures that are low in arousal (Bradley et al. 1992). To
further assess the memory enhancing eVects of the emo-
tional stimuli in the present study we applied a surprise
re-call and recognition task following the emotional Stroop
task.
The present study investigated whether emotional inter-
ference is produced by word valence or word arousal. We
also explored the inXuence of trait and state anxiety and
their interaction on emotional interference in a healthy sam-
ple. We hypothesize that the emotional interference eVect is
mediated by arousal and not valence, that is, colour-naming
latencies for negative and positive words will not diVer
when controlling for word arousal. We predict an inXuence
of trait and state anxiety on emotional interference.
Methods
Subjects
Fifty university students (30 female; 25.2 § 3.3 years,
mean age § standard deviation, SD) participated in the
study. Subjects were undergraduate or graduate students.
Individual diVerences in state and trait anxiety were
assessed using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI,123
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eVects of the experimental situation would distort results of
the questionnaires, these were applied right before the
actual experiment.
Stimulus material
In a pilot study (n = 47; age 27.0 § 7.6 years) 300 selected
nouns were rated with regard to valence and arousal using
seven-point rating scales. Twenty negative words (e.g. bur-
glary, victim; valence ¡2.21 § 0.38; arousal 4.26 § 0.12),
20 positive words (e.g. humour, party; valence 1.81 § 0.58;
arousal 4.27 § 0.34) and 20 neutral words (e.g. oats, coil;
valence 0.12 § 0.25; arousal 1.66 § 0.35) were chosen for
the emotional Stroop task. Positive and negative words did
not diVer with regard to arousal [Bonferroni-corrected t-test
t(38) = 0.11, P = 1.0]; however, they were more arousing
than neutral words [negative vs. neutral: t(38) = 31.07,
P < 0.01; positive vs. neutral: t(38) = 23.80, P < 0.01].
Negative, positive, and neutral words were comparable for
number of letters [F(2,57) = 1.14, MSE = 2.65, P = 0.33],
syllables [F(2,57) = 0.06, MSE = 0.26, P = 0.94] and
frequency [The CELEX database, F(2,57) = 0.06, MSE =
2313.39, P = 0.94], respectively.
Procedure
Emotional and neutral words in red, green, yellow, and blue
colour were displayed separately on a black computer
screen. The luminance of colours of words was comparable
(3 Candela/m2) as measured with a luminance meter
(Gossen Company, type MAVOLUX digital). Subjects had
to indicate the ink colour of the presented words using four
keys of a standard computer keyboard, while ignoring the
meaning of the word. Words were presented on the screen
until a response was given. Assignment of colours to keys
was counterbalanced across subjects.
The experiment consisted of two runs and each run con-
tained four blocks of neutral, positive, and negative words,
respectively (in total twelve blocks). A block design was
chosen because it proved to be the best method to elicit
emotional interference in healthy subjects in comparison
to a random and event-related stimulus presentation
(Bar-Haim et al. 2007). Order of blocks was pseudo-
randomized in an ABCBAC fashion (A = neutral, B =  pos-
itive, C = negative) to avoid consecutive presentation of
blocks of the same valence. Within each block ten words
(trials) were presented. Order of trials was pseudo-random-
ized to avoid that consecutive trials elicited the same man-
ual response. In total, subjects were exposed to 80 negative,
80 positive, and 80 neutral words. Before each block a Wxa-
tion cross was presented for 6 s; trials were separated by a
Wxation cross displayed for 1.5 s.
As training, subjects performed the classical Stroop task
prior to the experiment. The classical Stroop task consisted
of two blocks: during the Wrst block 60 congruent items (12
practice trials, 48 test trials, e.g. the word “red” written in
red colour) and during the second block 48 incongruent
items (e.g. the word “red” written in blue colour) were dis-
played.
Subsequent to the emotional Stroop task, subjects were
asked to re-call and recognize the presented words in a sur-
prise re-call and recognition task. In the surprise re-call task
they were asked to write down all the words they remem-
bered. In the surprise recognition task, each of the 60 word
stimuli from the experiment was presented with a distractor
item and subjects had to indicate which one was originally
presented in the experiment (e.g. oats vs. boat). Presenta-
tion of word pairs was pseudo-randomized, as was the
screen position (top or bottom) of the target word. Distrac-
tor items were matched with target items in terms of
valence and grammatical category (noun). Target and dis-
tractor items did not diVer for number of letters
[t(118) = 0.28, P = 0.78], syllables [t(118) = 0.17, P = 0.86],
and frequency [The CELEX database, t(112) = 1.55,
P = 0.12].
Results
Reaction time data and error rates
Colour-naming errors (1.8%) and consecutive trials were
eliminated from the data set. Individual reaction times of
more than two SDs from a subject’s mean were also
excluded from further analysis (4.9%). Mean reaction times
and error rates for negative, positive, and neutral words,
respectively, are displayed in Table 1.
Reaction time data and error rate data were submitted to
a repeated measures ANOVA. An alpha level of 0.05 was
set for all statistical tests. Reaction times were inXuenced by
the experimental conditions [F(2,98) = 7.07, MSE = 591.41,
Table 1 Reaction times (in milliseconds), error rates, re-call and
recognition rates for negative, positive, and neutral words (mean §
standard deviation; n = 50)
Negative Positive Neutral






Error rates 1.68 (§1.91) 1.26 (§1.32) 1.48 (§0.85)
Re-call rates 3.44 (§1.85) 3.88 (§2.23) 1.70 (§1.74)
Recognition 
rates
17.50 (§1.94) 17.06 (§2.07) 15.70 (§2.72)123
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times than neutral words [t(49) = 3.11, P < 0.01]. With
regard to valence, Bonferroni-corrected post hoc compari-
sons revealed that reaction times for negative and positive
words were signiWcantly longer than for neutral words
[negative t(49) = 2.49, P < 0.05; positive t(49) = 3.43,
P < 0.01]. Reaction times did not diVer signiWcantly
between negative and positive words [t(49) = 0.77, P = 1.0].
There was no eVect of experimental conditions on error
rates [F(2,98) = 1.31, MSE = 1.69, P = 0.28], that is, there
was no speed-accuracy trade-oV.
To investigate the magnitude of the emotional Stroop
eVect, we calculated an emotional interference score, deW-
ned as the diVerence between mean reaction times for neu-
tral and negative words (RTnegative ¡ RTneutral = 14.25 ms,
SD = 40.49) and for neutral and positive words
(RTpositive ¡ RTneutral = 17.06 ms, SD = 35.16), respectively
(see Table 1). The mean interference score for emotional
words independent of valence was RTemotional ¡
RTneutral = 15.65 ms (SD = 35.63). We used Cohen’s for-
mula for dependent measures (d = M1 ¡ M2/SDDiVerence £
q2) to calculate the eVect sizes of interference scores
(Cohen 1988). The eVect sizes were d = 0.49 for negative
vs. neutral, d = 0.68 for positive vs. neutral and d = 0.61 for
emotional vs. neutral words and are comparable to those
reported by Bar-Haim et al. (2007).
Reliability of emotional interference scores was tested
using the split-half method. Interference scores of emo-
tional stimuli from the Wrst half of each run were correlated
with the interference scores from the second half. Split-half
reliability amounted to 0.76 (Spearman-Brown corrected),
which is above the reliability scores for emotional interfer-
ence scores using a retest design with a 1-week interval
(Eide et al. 2002). Split-half reliability was 0.75 for nega-
tive and 0.65 for positive interference.
To summarize, reaction times did not diVer between
negative and positive words that were equal in arousal.
Reaction times for negative and positive words, however,
were both longer than for neutral words.
Individual diVerences in trait and state anxiety
Individual diVerences in trait and state anxiety were
assessed using the STAI (Laux et al. 1981). The mean trait
anxiety score in our sample was 36.42 (SD = 5.83), the
mean state anxiety score 33.56 (SD = 6.53). To investigate
eVects of both trait and state anxiety on emotional interfer-
ence we conducted a regression analysis with state and trait
anxiety and its interaction term (after z-standardization) as
continuous predictors of emotional interference. Compared
to bivariate correlational analyses, this approach has the
advantage of estimating the particular inXuence of each
predictor while controlling for the inXuence of the other
predictors at the same time. As we hypothesized a positive
association of anxiety scores with interference, we applied
one-tailed signiWcance testing to the data. The regression
model was signiWcant [F(3,46) = 3.64, P = 0.02, R2 = 0.19]
and revealed a signiWcant eVect of state anxiety (ß = 0.41,
P = 0.01), but no eVect of trait anxiety or the interaction
term (both ß < 0.05, ns). For the valence-dependent inter-
ference separate analyses were conducted with positive and
negative interference as the to-be-predicted variables. The
regression model for positive interference proved to be sig-
niWcant [F(3,46) = 5.12, P < 0.01, R2 = 0.25] with state
anxiety being the only signiWcant predictor (ß = 0.44,
P = 0.01). The model for negative interference failed to
reach signiWcance [F(3,46) = 1.99, P = 0.13, R2 = 0.12],
however, the regression coeYcient of state anxiety
remained signiWcant (ß = 0.33, P < 0.05). The failure to
demonstrate an eVect of trait anxiety may be explained by
an only minor variation of trait anxiety scores in our sample
(SD in t-norm equivalent 5.98) compared to the norm sam-
ple (Laux et al. 1981).
To summarize, regression analyses results indicate that
individual diVerences in state anxiety inXuenced emotional
interference, trait anxiety, however, did not and there were
no interactive eVects of state and trait anxiety.
Re-call and recognition data
There was a signiWcant eVect of experimental conditions
on free re-call [F(2,98) = 31.04, MSE = 2.14, P < 0.01].
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t-tests revealed that negative
and positive words were better re-called than neutral words
[negative vs. neutral t(49) = 6.13, P < 0.01; positive vs.
neutral: t(49) = 6.89, P < 0.01] (see Table 1). There was no
diVerence between negative and positive words [t(49) =
1.60, P = 0.35].
Recognition of negative, positive, and neutral words was
above chance [ts(49) > 24.00, Ps < 0.01]. There also was a
signiWcant eVect of experimental conditions on recognition
[F(2,98) = 16.22, MSE = 2.71, P < 0.01]. Post hoc t-tests
revealed that negative and positive words were better rec-
ognized than neutral words [negative vs. neutral t(49) =
4.95, P < 0.01; positive vs. neutral t(49) = 4.13, P < 0.01]
(see Table 1). There was no diVerence between negative
and positive words [t(49) = 1.51, P = 0.41].
To summarize, re-call and recognition scores did not
diVer between negative and positive words that were equal
in arousal. However, negative and positive words were bet-
ter re-called and recognized than neutral words.
To control for the possibility of attention-mediated
(instead of arousal-mediated) memory eVects we conducted
regression analyses with re-call and recognition scores for
each word (sum of free re-call and recognition scores) as
the to-be-predicted variables, and with the mean reaction123
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ticipants as predictors (Lang et al. 1993). The regression
model was signiWcant for both re-call [F(2,57) = 18.09,
P < 0.01, R2 = 0.38] and recognition scores [F(2,57) = 5.98,
P < 0.01, R2 = 0.17]. For re-call scores both arousal
(ß = 0.22, P < 0.05) and reaction time (ß = 0.52, P < 0.01)
were signiWcant predictors. For the recognition score
model, however, only arousal scores proved to be a signiW-
cant predictor (ß = 0.42, P < 0.01), indicating that atten-
tion-mediating eVects were irrelevant with regard to
recognition performance.
Discussion
In the present study, we investigated whether emotional
interference is produced by word valence or word arousal.
Consistent with our hypothesis we found an emotional inter-
ference eVect for emotional words, independent of word
valence. The surprise re-call and recognition task revealed
that emotional words were better re-called and recognized
than neutral words and that the recognition eVect was not
mediated by attention, but by arousal. We also investigated
the inXuence of individual diVerences in state and trait anxi-
ety on emotional interference. State anxiety was associated
with emotional interference, that is, emotional interference
was enhanced in subjects with high state anxiety. Trait anxi-
ety had no inXuence on emotional interference.
Arousing word stimuli, independently of their valence
produced emotional interference, that is, ink colour-naming
latencies for both positive and negative compared to neutral
words were increased.
The eVect sizes for the interference eVects of emotional
words (about 0.50) in the present study are consistent with
the eVect sizes reported in a meta-analysis on emotional
interference (Bar-Haim et al. 2007). Bar-Haim et al. (2007)
report a reliable attentional bias for diVerent paradigms in
anxious subjects. Interestingly, with regard to the emotional
Stroop task they report that only blocked presentation of
emotional words elicits emotional interference in non-clini-
cal control subjects whereas mixed presentation did not.
Similarly, in our study emotional interference occurred
with a blocked presentation of emotional words of the same
valence.
The present Wndings do not support the categorical nega-
tivity theory, which postulates that only stimuli automati-
cally evaluated as negative attract attention (Pratto and
John 1991). The results of the current study add to the
increasing evidence that arousal, and not valence, produces
emotional interference in information processing tasks such
as the emotional Stroop task (Compton et al. 2003; Schim-
mack 2005), the attentional blink paradigm (Anderson
2005), or spatial attention paradigms (Robinson and Compton
2006). In contrast to the categorical negativity theory, the
arousal theory postulates that the Wrst appraisal of a stimu-
lus is related to arousal and not valence (Anderson 2005;
Lang et al. 1993, Schimmack 2005). The present Wndings,
however, go beyond the results by Compton et al. (2003)
by revealing an interference eVect not only for high vs. low
arousing negative words, but also for highly arousing
words independently of their valence, that is, for both posi-
tive and negative words. Schimmack (2005) showed that
arousal levels of very unpleasant pictures and pleasant pic-
tures of opposite-sex models predicted interference eVects.
This arousal eVect is in line with the Wnding of Robinson
and Compton (2006). The researchers independently varied
valence and arousal of pictorial stimuli and found that
highly arousing pictures, independent of their valence,
resulted in a leftward visual shift of attention indicated by
faster responses to subsequently presented targets in the left
compared to the right visual Weld. The present Wndings
accord well with these results, extending the assumptions
of the arousal theory from visual to verbal material and fur-
thermore show that interference is also produced by posi-
tive stimuli other than sexually arousing stimuli that may
represent a very distinctive incentive.
The interference eVect is thought to reXect increased
allocation of attentional resources to emotional stimuli,
especially negative ones (Pratto and John 1991). The pres-
ent Wndings, however, indicate that allocation of attentional
resources is rather mediated by arousal of stimuli. This may
facilitate further and more in-depth processing of relevant
stimuli to guide adaptive behaviour of an individual
(Schimmack 2005; Pratto and John 1991). Processing stim-
uli in greater depth or on a more elaborated level may
increase the accessibility of the stored representations and
result in increased re-call and recognition.
This “emotional memory enhancement eVect” was also
shown in the present study. During the free re-call and rec-
ognition tasks, signiWcantly more emotional words than
neutral words were re-called and recognized. The fact, that
as many positive as negative words were re-called and rec-
ognized again indicates that the arousal dimension has a
greater or at least more immediate impact than the valence
dimension and is consistent with the reaction time data.
The present results are in line with Wndings indicating
that memory performance is most sensitive to the arousal
level of the stimuli, that is, pictures that were rated as
highly arousing are better remembered than less arousing
pictures (e.g. Bradley et al. 1992).
The better memory performance found for highly arous-
ing words (independent of valence) might be mediated by
attention. That is, the longer exposure times of emotional as
compared to neutral words as indicated by prolonged reac-
tion times during colour-naming of emotional words may
allow for longer consolidation processes which, in turn,123
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ever, this was only partly true for the re-call performance,
as longer reaction times and higher arousal scores predicted
re-call scores for emotional words. This can be interpreted
as a better re-call performance for words that have been
processed to greater depth due to longer exposure time.
Conversely, the regression analysis for the recognition
scores revealed that only the arousal scores but not word
reaction times (as a measure of attention) were signiWcant
predictors of the recognition scores, indicating that recogni-
tion performance is aVected by word arousal and not medi-
ated by attention. However, there is evidence that
disruptive eVects of emotional Stroop words (e.g. memory
eVects) are mediated by mechanisms that last longer than
the response interval of the actual trial (e.g. McKenna and
Sharma 2004). We can therefore not rule out that a better
recognition performance for emotional words was due to a
“longer consolidation process” in the inter-trial interval.
What do these results tell us, that the eVect of arousal on
recognition was not mediated by attention? There is behav-
ioural evidence for automatic emotional perception in the
absence of conscious awareness. For instance, several stud-
ies have demonstrated that subjects can make good/bad
evaluative judgements of subliminally presented words at
better-than-chance levels (for a review see Pratto 1994).
Such automatic emotional word perception is likely to be
mediated by a subcortical circuit involving the amygdala
that acts as a detector of emotional word content at a very
early stage of processing (Landis 2006; Naccache et al.
2005). More speciWcally, the amygdala is critical for intact
recognition of emotional arousal from words, sentences,
and facial expressions, but not for intact recognition of
emotional valence (Adolphs et al. 1999). Indeed, distinct
neural networks contribute to emotional memory enhance-
ment for arousing words vs. valenced, non-arousing words:
memory enhancement for arousing words is mediated by
an amygdalar-hippocampal-network, whereas memory
enhancement eVect for valenced, non-arousing words is
supported by a prefrontal-hippocampal network associated
with controlled, self-generated encoding processes (Ken-
singer and Corkin 2004).
In conclusion, the dimensions of valence and arousal
both inXuence memory-encoding processes, however, their
eVects may be diVerentially mediated (Kensinger and
Corkin 2004). That is, eVects of arousal are mediated by a
subcortical network involving the amygdala that automati-
cally activates in response to subliminally presented
emotional word stimuli (Adolphs et al. 1999; Naccache
et al. 2005). These Wndings speak for a memory enhance-
ment eVect for emotional words that is primarily mediated
by the arousal dimension occurring before attentional
processes step in. Taken together, the present experiment
revealed that arousal and not valence inXuenced colour-
naming latencies as well as re-call and recognition perfor-
mance.
Individual diVerences in state anxiety were associated
with the emotional interference eVect, that is, subjects with
higher state anxiety showed increased emotional interfer-
ence. This Wnding is in accordance with other studies inves-
tigating the eVect of state anxiety on emotional interference
(see Bar-Haim et al. 2007) and supports the notion that anx-
iety is associated with automatic allocation of attentional
resources to threat-related stimuli (Williams et al. 1997)
and emotional stimuli in general, respectively, thereby
binding cognitive resources. State anxiety represents a tem-
porary emotional state associated with psychophysiological
responses to allow for immediate behavioural reactions,
that is, state anxiety appears to be more preparatory for
action than trait anxiety. An acute emotional state such as
state anxiety may denote a greater behavioural urgency that
has greater impact on cognitive performance. Additional
assessment of psychophysiological arousal may clarify
whether bodily arousal plays an essential role in inXuencing
cognitive performance or, if absent, whether cognitive
arousal or state of alertness without concomitant psycho-
physiological arousal may have similar eVects.
In contrast to state anxiety, individual diVerences in trait
anxiety had no inXuence on neither negative nor positive
emotional interference in the present study. Similarly,
Martin et al. (1991) and EgloV and Hock (2001) also failed
to Wnd an eVect of trait anxiety on emotional interference in
a healthy sample. How can this Wnding be explained? Sub-
jects with high trait anxiety may have developed emotion
regulative strategies or coping mechanisms to regulate their
mood. This may be especially the case in situations where
individuals are motivated to perform well on a diYcult task
as in a laboratory experiment. Moreover, trait anxiety rep-
resents a stable tendency to respond with anxiety, but does
not imply that the individual is in a constant state of worry
and apprehension that inXuences cognitive performance.
The failure to demonstrate an association between trait anx-
iety and emotional interference may also relate to the little
range in trait anxiety scores in our healthy sample as a low
variation impedes the demonstration of an association of
trait anxiety with interference magnitude.
Rusting postulated three conceptual frameworks of how
personality trait and mood states may inXuence emotional
processing (Rusting 1998). First, personality traits and
mood states have independent eVects; second, personality
traits moderate the inXuence of mood states on emotional
processing (i.e. mood states may have diVerent outcomes
depending on the personality traits); third, inXuences of
personality traits on emotional processing are mediated by
current mood states (i.e. traits render one more susceptible
to certain mood states which then inXuence emotional pro-
cessing) (Rusting 1998). As the present study simultaneously123
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eVects we can infer from the present data that state and trait
anxiety have independent eVects on emotional processing.
In conclusion, the present data indicate an exclusive
eVect of state anxiety on emotional processing. Cognitive
theories explaining the attentional bias in anxiety diVer in
whether they assume an eVect of anxiety on earlier auto-
matic stages of processing (i.e. hypervigilance) or on later
stages of processing (i.e. avoidance of emotional informa-
tion or impaired ability to disengage from threatening
information). Whether state anxious subjects show a hyper-
vigilance towards emotional information cannot be inferred
from the present data. The data clearly indicate, however,
that state anxiety is associated with a diYculty in disengag-
ing attention from emotional material.
Further research on the interference eVect of emotional
material should consider subject characteristics (e.g. aVec-
tivity) and stimulus characteristics (e.g. arousal). Assess-
ment of psychophysiological changes may further clarify
the signiWcance of dimensions of arousal such as cognitive
arousal vs. bodily arousal in producing interference, espe-
cially in cases where self-reported and objectively mea-
sured arousal dissociate as they do in repression.
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